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"Those who have studied the contempt power and its exer-
cise by the courts are unanimous on only one point - since
its inception the law of contempt of court has been in a state
of confusion that neither court nor legislature has been able
to eliminate.'''
I. INTRODUCTION
A court's ability to protect litigants and uphold the dignity of
its own process through use of the contempt power dates back
to ancient times. 2 Nonetheless, no area of law has so consist-
ently confounded practitioners and the judiciary. Contempt of
court has been referred to as "a mysterious and indefinable
offense and as easy to commit as it is liable to speedy and de-
t ChiefJudge, Minnesota Court of Appeals; B.A. 1943, cum laude, College of St.
Thomas; J.D. 1948, University of Minnesota Law School.
I Chief Attorney, Minnesota Court of Appeals; B.A. 1977, College of St. Cath-
erine; J.D. 1981, cum laude, Hamline University School of Law.
The authors wish to acknowledge the preliminary research assistance provided by
Mullen Dowdal, law clerk to the ChiefJudge, 1990-91, and to express their apprecia-
tion to Laura Zdychnec, law clerk to the Chief Judge, 1991-92, for her invaluable
assistance.
1. Robert J. Martineau, Contempt of Court: Eliminating the Confusion Between Civil
and Criminal Contempt, 50 U. CIN. L. REV. 677, 681 (1981) (citations omitted).
2. RONALD GOLDFARB, THE CONTEMPr POWER 11-13 (1963).
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served punishment."' Leaving an exhaustive survey of the
area to scholars, this article attempts to chart a practical course
for Minnesota judges and practitioners through the murky wa-
ters of contempt law, in hopes that some of the major obstacles
can be avoided.
II. HISTORY OF CONTEMPT
The exercise of contempt power has a long and illustrious
history.4 Contempt proceedings have been documented from
the 10th century, when they were used to enforce the mon-
arch's sovereign rights.5 Reported Minnesota decisions on
contempt are of more recent vintage and a more plebeian na-
ture. However, a Minnesota Supreme Court opinion issued in
1889 reveals a well-developed understanding of the use of con-
tempt.6 The contempt power has evolved over time, and
courts now view it as an inherent and necessary device in the
administration of law and order.
Although the inherent power analysis has occasionally been
criticized," a state legislature's authority to regulate judicial
contempt appears unclear.9 The law of contempt has been de-
veloped by the courts, and they will continue to bear primary
responsibility for administering and refining it.
The contempt power is employed for three purposes:
3. EDWARD DANGEL, CONTEMPT § 41, at 14 (1939).
4. See generally SIR JOHN CHARLES Fox, THE HISTORY OF CONTEMPT OF COURT
(1972); GOLDFARB, supra note 2, at 11-13.
5. GOLDFARB, supra note 2, at 11-13.
6. See In re Fanning, 40 Minn. 4, 4, 41 N.W. 1076, 1077 (1889).
7. Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton Et Fils, S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 798 (1987);
Michaelson v. United States ex rel. Chicago, St. P., Mpls., & Om. Ry., 266 U.S. 42, 65
(1924). While the power of Minnesota courts to exercise contempt power is ex-
pressly granted by statute, contempt power is said to exist independently of statutory
authority. See MINN. STAT. §§ 588.01-.20 (1990 & Supp. 1991); In re Welfare of
R.L.W., 309 Minn. 489, 491, 245 N.W.2d 204, 205-06 (1976).
8. See generally Felix Frankfurter & James M. Landis, Power of Congress Over Proce-
dure in Criminal Contempts in "Inferior" Federal Courts-A Study in Separation of Powers, 37
HARV. L. REV. 1010 (1924) (arguing that the contempt practices of many jurisdictions
exceed constitutional limitations); see also Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 198 n.2
(1968) (providing historical overview of criminal contempt; concluding that examina-
tion should rest on constitutional analysis).
9. Some courts, including the Minnesota Supreme Court, have refused to rec-
ognize legislative attempts to regulate contempt power. See State v. Binder, 190
Minn. 305, 313, 251 N.W. 665, 668 (1933); see also State v. Morrill, 16 Ark. 384, 384-
85 (1855); State v. Shumaker, 164 N.E. 408, 409-10 (Ind. 1928).
[Vol. 18
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(1) to punish an individual for violating a court's order or
interfering with judicial proceedings;
(2) to coerce an individual to comply with a court order;
and
(3) to provide damages to a party injured by the contem-
nor's acts in violation of an order.'
0
In each case, identifying the purpose to be served is essential
because the court's imposition of penalties and sanctions, as
well as the requisite procedures to be followed, are con-
strained by the purpose of the proceedings."
III. DISTINGUISHING CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CONTEMPT
The primary source of confusion in contempt law stems
from attempts to distinguish civil and criminal contempt. In
Minnesota, the courts have broad statutory authority to punish
those committing contempt,' 2 but the statutes do not define
civil and criminal contempt.' 3 Whether contempt proceedings
are civil or criminal depends upon the court's purpose in re-
sponding to alleged misconduct rather than the nature of the
misconduct itself.'4 A reviewing court should focus on the
lower court's response, not on the underlying conduct of the
parties or the characterization of proceedings by the parties
and trial judge.15
The United States Supreme Court, in its first attempt to clar-
ify the distinction between criminal and civil contempt, pro-
phetically noted, "It may not be always easy to classify a
particular act as belonging to either one of these two
classes."' 6 The Court initially tried to differentiate between
civil and criminal contempt by examining the interest to be
protected and determining whether a private party or the
court's dignity benefitted from the sanction.' 7 Because a sin-
10. United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 302-04 (1947).
11. See generally 17 AM. JUR. 2D Contempt §§ 3-6, 77-78, 104-113 (1990).
12. MINN. STAT. § 588.02 (1990).
13. But see MINN. STAT. § 588.20 (1990) (categorizing diverse types of behavior as
criminal contempt, without explanation).
14. In re Welfare of A.W., 399 N.W.2d 223, 225 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987); see also
Knajdek v. West, 278 Minn. 282, 285, 153 N.W.2d 846, 848 (1967); Red River Potato
Growers Ass'n v. Bernardy, 128 Minn. 153, 156, 150 N.W. 383, 384 (1915); In re
Nelson, 408 N.W.2d 618, 621 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
15. Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 369 (1966); see infra note 20.
16. Bessette v. W.B. Conkey Co., 194 U.S. 324, 329 (1904).
17. Id. at 328; see also In re Fanning, 40 Minn. 4, 4, 41 N.W. 1076, 1077 (1889)
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gle act may simultaneously offend the court's authority and in-
jure a party, this definitional approach proved inadequate.1 8
Although the definitional approach, which sought to identify
the interest at stake, was not entirely satisfactory, the court was
reluctant to abandon it completely. The Court attempted to
refine the distinction between civil and criminal contempt by
shifting the focus subtly to the purpose of the court and away
from the interest to be vindicated.
It is not the fact of punishment but rather its character and
purpose that often serve to distinguish between the two
classes of cases. If it is for civil contempt, then the punish-
ment is remedial, and for the benefit of the complainant.
But if it is for criminal contempt, the sentence is punitive, to
vindicate the authority of the court.'"
Courts and commentators have had great difficulty applying
these tests to distinguish between civil and criminal con-
tempt. 20 Consequently, numerous alternative tests have been
proposed.2 ' Ultimately, the federal appellate courts have
abandoned the definitional approach and shifted their atten-
tion to the nature of the sanction imposed upon the contem-
nor.2 2  Because the application of federal constitutional
protections turns on the characterization of a contempt pro-
(holding that a contempt order has "a double aspect" of punishment and coercing
compliance).
18. For example, refusal to pay court-ordered child support or maintenance in-
jures the intended recipient, but may also be seen as a challenge to the court's au-
thority. Therefore, a single act may be properly classified as either civil or criminal
contempt. See Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441 (1911); Bes-
sette, 194 U.S. at 329; Lopiparo v. United States, 222 F.2d 897, 898 (8th Cir. 1955); see
also GOLDFARB, supra note 2, at 53 (noting that the greatest percentage of cases could
fall into either category, depending on the discretion of the judge).
19. Gompers, 221 U.S. at 441.
20. GOLDFARB, supra note 2, at 67. The frustration ofjudges and practitioners at
the state and federal levels caused by the difficulty in distinguishing civil from crimi-
nal contempt is understandable.
[Olne widely used rule illustrates the confusion on this topic: the designa-
tion by the court trying the contempt of whether the proceeding is for civil or
criminal contempt is not dispositive, and in fact, is usually a minor consider-
ation on appeal.
Diana J. Vogt, Note, Modem Discussion of a Venerable Power: Civil Versus Criminal Con-
tempt and Its Role in Child Support Enforcement: Hicks v. Feiock, 22 CREIGHTON L. REV.
163, 169 (1988) (emphasis in original) (citing Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S.
364, 369 (1966)). In effect, the appellate courts disregard the trial court's designa-
tion because it is so often in error.
21. Dan B. Dobbs, Contempt of Court: A Survey, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 183, 239
(1971).
22. See Vogt, supra note 20, at 169.
(Vol. 18
4
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 1 [1992], Art. 2
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol18/iss1/2
CONTEMPT
ceeding as civil or criminal, and because that characterization
is a question of federal law, 23 this shift has inevitably affected
the state courts' review of contempt proceedings. The control-
ling test incorporates the "purpose" test and is ostensibly sim-
ple: contempt is criminal when the relief imposed is a definite
term of imprisonment or a fine payable to the court;24 con-
tempt is civil when the contemnor can purge the contempt by
performance of an affirmative act required by the court.25
Some commentators still argue that the claimed distinctions
between civil and criminal contempt are "more apparent than
real .... "26 Nonetheless, because the required procedures
vary significantly, a trial court which fails to determine whether
the proceedings are civil or criminal in nature faces the inevita-
ble prospect of committing reversible error.27 If the court's
purpose is to vindicate its authority and punish the contemnor
for past behavior, it must conduct a criminal contempt pro-
ceeding and may impose a fixed, unconditional sanction.28 If
the court's purpose is to vindicate the rights of an opposing
party by coercing compliance with an order, the court must
comply with all procedural prerequisites for civil contempt and
craft a sanction of indefinite duration, to be lifted upon compli-
ance. 29 In either civil or criminal contempt proceedings, the
court may impose fines or imprisonment.3 0
When faced with a party's violation of an order, the court
may, depending on what it is trying to accomplish, have the
option of pursuing either type of contempt. The most com-
mon situation involves a party's failure to pay spousal mainte-
nance or child support. If the conduct is offensive to the state
23. Hicks ex rel. Feiock v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 630 (1988).
24. Id. at 632-33.
25. Id.
26. E.g., Edward G. Mascolo, Procedural Due Process and the Reasonable Doubt Stan-
dard of Proof in Civil Contempt Proceedings, 14 NEw ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIv. CONFINE-
MENT 245, 246 (1988).
27. Skinner v. White, 505 F.2d 685, 689-90 (5th Cir. 1974) (reversing contempt
conviction where trial court did not determine whether proceeding was for criminal
or civil contempt).
28. See, e.g., McCrone v. United States, 307 U.S. 61, 64 (1939); Gompers v. Bucks
Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441-42 (1911); Bessette v. W.B. Conkey Co., 194
U.S. 324, 328 (1904); Minnesota State Bar Ass'n v. Divorce Assistance Ass'n, 311
Minn. 276, 285, 248 N.W.2d 733, 741 (1976); In re Welfare of A.W., 399 N.W.2d 223,
225 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
29. Hopp v. Hopp, 279 Minn. 170, 173, 156 N.W.2d 212, 216 (1968).
30. See MINN. STAT. § 588.02 (1990).
1992]
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as a whole and the court wishes to punish the obligor and deter
future misconduct, then criminal contempt is proper.3 ' If the
court's purpose is to make the obligor comply with the judg-
ment and decree or an order for support, then civil contempt
proceedings are proper.3 2 Even in civil proceedings, the court
may order imprisonment or a fine, but the party must be able
to avoid or purge the sanction by compliance with the pre-ex-
isting obligation.33
Criminal contempt may be appropriate where a previous
court order was intended to enforce a party's rights but an-
other party's misconduct effectively defeats that intent. If the
contemnor may still perform, then coercive civil contempt is
proper. However, if the party's rights have been irrevocably
defeated by the contemnor's action, coercive contempt is inef-
fective. Since imposition of a sanction in such cases would
have no remedial aspect, criminal contempt is appropriate.3 4
IV. DIRECT OR CONSTRUCTIVE CONTEMPT?
The distinction between direct and constructive contempt is
a less important distinction. Nonetheless, the issue has led to
considerable confusion. Direct contempt usually refers to con-
duct that occurs in the court's immediate presence and is dis-
ruptive of the dignity of courtroom proceedings. 5
Constructive contempt usually refers to conduct that occurs
outside the court's direct view or immediate presence. 6 Some
acts, however, such as perjury3 7 or an attorney's failure to
31. See Peterson v. Peterson, 278 Minn. 275, 278, 153 N.W.2d 825, 828 (Minn.
1967); Gardner v. Conway, 234 Minn. 468, 473, 48 N.W.2d 788, 792 (1951). But see
Hicks ex rel. Feiock v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 637-38 (1988) (distinguishing the obli-
gor's burden of proof to establish inability to pay in civil contempt proceedings from
the state's burden in criminal contempt proceedings).
32. Minnesota State Bar Ass'n, 311 Minn. at 285, 248 N.W.2d at 741.
33. See id. at 285, 248 N.W.2d at 741; Hopp, 279 Minn. at 175, 156 N.W.2d at 217;
In re Nelson, 408 N.W.2d 618, 621 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
34. See In re Welfare of A.W., 399 N.W.2d 223, 225 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987); Swift
& Co. v. United Packing House Workers, 228 Minn. 571, 572, 37 N.W.2d 831, 832
(1949).
35. MINN. STAT. § 588.01, subd. 2 (1990).
36. Id. at subd. 3.
37. See In re Welfare of E.J.B., 466 N.W.2d 768 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (holding
witness' alleged perjury not clearly direct contempt because proof of perjury requires
going beyond what judge observes in court); see also J.A. Bock, Annotation, Perjury or
False Swearing as Contempt, 89 A.L.R.2D 1258 (1963).
[Vol. 18
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make a required court appearance, are not easily categorized
as direct or constructive.
Classifying contempt as direct or constructive allows the
court to distinguish relatively rare conduct which may be pun-
ished summarily3 9 from more common conduct which gives
rise to specific procedural rights.4 ° These procedural rights
must be observed prior to a finding of contempt and the impo-
sition of sanctions. I Once again, the court must determine
the purpose of its response to the conduct. Even if the con-
duct occurs in the immediate presence of the court, the court
must determine whether it is punishing a completed act to pre-
serve the court's authority or whether it is attempting to coerce
a party to change its conduct. 42 In short, even though the dis-
tinction between civil and criminal contempt does not restrict
the court's ability to respond summarily to acts occurring in its
immediate presence, the distinction will control the sanction to
be imposed.
Constructive contempt also may be civil or criminal. How-
ever, because the conduct does not occur in the presence of
the court, record evidence is always required to establish the
38. See Knajdek v. West, 278 Minn. 282, 153 N.W.2d 846 (1967). This particular
offense has been the subject of both serious and not-so-serious discussions:
It is not always immediately clear whether a contempt is committed in the
court's presence; for example, when an attorney fails to appear before the
court at the appointed time, troubling metaphysical questions arise; is the
contemptuous nonappearance made in the court's presence? If not, where?
Is the nonappearance out of the court's presence? If so, is the offense re-
peated each time he appears somewhere else? Quite sensibly the courts
have answered-'"well, yes and no."
Jack S. Nordby, There are No Bad Judges: Random Thoughts on the Aesthetics of Criminal
Contempt, HENNEPIN LAw., Nov.-Dec. 1974, at 8. See generally John E. Theuman, Anno-
tation, Attorney's Failure to Attend Court, or Tardiness, as Contempt, 13 A.L.R.4T 122
(1982) (analyzing state and federal cases considering the liability of an attorney and
punishment for contempt for failure to appear in court).
39. See MINN. STAT. § 588.03 (1990).
40. See, e.g., In re Welfare of EJ.B., 466 N.W.2d 768, 770 (Minn. 1991) (holding
that criminal contempt requires criminal procedural safeguards).
41. E.g., Peterson v. Peterson, 278 Minn. 275, 278, 153 N.W.2d 825, 828 (1967);
In re Welfare of A.W., 399 N.W.2d 223, 226 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
42. For instance, ifa witness refuses to answer questions after being sworn, he or
she may be adjudged guilty of criminal contempt. MINN. STAT. § 588.20, subd. 6
(1990). If the court believes the witness is likely to answer if subject to incarceration,
the witness may be adjudged to be in civil contempt and confined until compliance
with the court's order to answer. In either case, the conduct constitutes direct con-
tempt. However, the court must determine the purpose of the sanction and elect to
treat the conduct as an act of direct criminal contempt or direct civil contempt.
1992]
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circumstances of constructive contempt.43 In cases involving
constructive contempt, the distinction between civil and crimi-
nal contempt assumes even greater importance. While all
cases of constructive contempt mandate a hearing and may not
be resolved summarily, the type of further proceeding and
sanction to be imposed differs substantially between civil and
criminal cases. As soon as an allegation of constructive con-
tempt is made, the court must determine the specific purpose
of further proceedings, and decide whether to pursue the mat-
ter as a civil or criminal contempt.
V. CIVIL CONTEMPT
Civil contempt provides a speedy, efficient, and flexible
means of enforcing one individual's adjudicated rights against
another. It is, in effect, an enforcement remedy benefitting a
party. 44 A civil contempt order issues as part of a pending ac-
tion. 45 Thus, if the main action is dismissed or cannot be sus-
tained, all civil contempt proceedings end also.46 Although the
court's authority to employ civil contempt is broad, there are
specific limitations on the exercise of that authority. In the
landmark case of Hopp v. Hopp,47 the Minnesota Supreme
Court identified eight distinct principles which limit civil con-
tempt powers. A valid civil contempt order requires:
(1) that the court have jurisdiction over the subject matter
and the contemnor;
(2) a clear definition of the acts to be performed;
(3) notice of the acts to be performed and time to comply;
(4) an application by the party seeking enforcement, with
specific grounds for complaint;
(5) a hearing, after due notice, to afford the nonperform-
43. See Peterson, 278 Minn. at 278, 153 N.W.2d at 828 (holding that contempt trial
is necessary to establish record of circumstances surrounding constructive
contempt).
44. Because civil contempt proceedings enforce a party's rights under an existing
order, they are stayed by the posting of a supersedeas bond in connection with an
appeal from the underlying order. James E. Sutherland & Irvin C. Iverson, Construc-
tive Civil Contempt in Minnesota: Guidelines, BENCH & BAR, Jan. 1969, at 5, 9. In the
absence of a bond or other stay, the trial court retains jurisdiction to enforce an order
during the pendency of an appeal, and contempt proceedings may be pursued even
while the contemnor challenges the underlying order in a separate appeal.
45. See Pacific Gamble Robinson Co. v. Minneapolis & St. L. Ry., 92 F. Supp. 352,
354 (D. Minn. 1950).
46. Id.; see also Proper v. Proper, 188 Minn. 15, 18-19, 246 N.W. 481, 482 (1933).
47. 279 Minn. 170, 156 N.W.2d 212 (1968).
[Vol. 18
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ing party an opportunity to show compliance or the
reasons for failure;
(6) a formal determination by the court of failure to com-
ply and a determination whether conditional confine-
ment will aid compliance;
(7) an opportunity for the nonperforming party to show
inability to perform despite good faith effort; and
(8) the contemnor's ability to gain release through compli-
ance or a good faith effort to comply.48
Although the Hopp guidelines appear to establish a simple
checklist of procedures, Minnesota courts and litigants con-
tinue to struggle with their application. The court in Hopp de-
cried "delay and formalism" in civil contempt proceedings;
49
nonetheless, its decision requires explicit findings on each of
the eight criteria.50 Most civil contempt proceedings involve
constructive contempt, so that summary adjudication is im-
proper. Therefore, some delay is inevitable as hearings are
scheduled and noticed. The failure of litigants and trial courts
to address each element of Hopp frequently compels a remand,
resulting in even greater delay.5 '
As a preliminary matter, the ordering court must have juris-
diction over both the subject matter and the alleged contem-
nor. 52 In addition, the conduct required of the contemnor
must be clearly identified in an existing order or decree.5 3 The
alleged contemnor must have had notice of the required con-
duct and a reasonable time to comply.5 4 Failure to comply
must be brought to the court's attention by the enforcing
party, who must state with specificity the grounds for
48. Id. at 174-75, 156 N.W.2d 216-17; see also Walz v. Walz, 409 N.W.2d 39, 40
(Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
49. Hopp, 279 Minn. at 174, 156 N.W.2d at 216.
50. Id. at 174-75, 156 N.W.2d at 216-17.
51. See, e.g., Walz, 409 N.W.2d at 40-41.
52. Hopp, 279 Minn. at 174, 156 N.W.2d at 216.
53. See, e.g., Mikoda v. Mikoda, 413 N.W.2d 238, 244 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (cit-
ing Hopp, 279 Minn. at 174, 156 N.W.2d at 216) (holding that trial court did not err
in failing to find appellant in contempt where divorce decree allegedly violated was
ambiguous as to acts to be performed).
Not all violations of a court order are punishable by contempt. For instance, an
order for the delivery of property is enforceable by execution and not by contempt.
Burgardt v. Burgardt, 474 N.W.2d 235, 236-37 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (noting, how-
ever, that "Minnesota courts . . . have explicit statutory authority to use contempt
proceedings to enforce maintenance and child support obligations").
54. Hopp, 279 Minn. at 174, 156 N.W.2d at 216.
1992]
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complaint.55
After being notified of the alleged noncompliance, the court
must give the alleged contemnor notice of a hearing at which
he or she will have an opportunity to establish that they actu-
ally complied with the existing order or to give reasons for the
failure to comply. 5 6 A court has no authority to find a person
in constructive civil contempt until he or she has appeared
before the court, either voluntarily or involuntarily, and has
been examined.57 If the party accused of contempt fails to
appear at a noticed hearing, the court may order him or her
arrested immediately and held until the hearing, or the court
may elect to continue the matter and again order
appearance.58
After securing the alleged contemnor's appearance, the
court must determine, first, whether the person failed to com-
ply with a prior court order; and, second, whether conditional
confinement is reasonably likely to produce compliance in part
or in full.59
Once the court has found a failure to comply, the contemnor
may assert an inability to perform.6° The contemnor has the
burden of production on this issue.6 ' The contemnor must es-
tablish more than a lack of present resources or will to dis-
charge the obligations; his or her capacity and past
performance must be considered.
62
After a duly noticed hearing at which the trial court has
taken record evidence on each of the Hopp factors and con-
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. MINN. STAT. §§ 588.09-.10 (1990); Clausen v. Clausen, 250 Minn. 293, 296-
99, 84 N.W.2d 675, 678-80 (1957); cf. Smoot v. Smoot, 329 N.W.2d 829, 832 (Minn.
1983) (finding hearing requirement met where the contemnor has submitted an affi-
davit admitting to the contempt).
58. MINN. STAT. § 588.04 (1990); Westgor v. Grimm, 381 N.W.2d 877, 880
(Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that trial court erred by finding appellant in con-
tempt without first securing his presence); see also MINN. STAT. § 588.08 (1990).
59. Tatro v. Tatro, 390 N.W.2d 461, 464 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (citing Hopp, 279
Minn. at 175, 156 N.W.2d at 217).
60. United States v. Rylander, 460 U.S. 752, 757 (1983).
61. Id.; Hurd v. Hurd, 63 Minn. 443, 445, 65 N.W. 725, 729 (1896) (holding that
defendant has burden of proof to show inability to satisfy court order).
62. Hopp v. Hopp, 279 Minn. 170, 175-77, 156 N.W.2d 212, 217-18 (1968) (cit-
ing State ex rel. Houtchens v. District Court, 199 P.2d 272, 275 (Mont. 1948); 2 WIL-
LIAM T. NELSON, NELSON ON DIVORCE AND ANNULMENT § 1625, at 435-36 (F. Reed
Poore et al. eds., 2d ed. 1961)).
[Vol. 18
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cluded that a finding of contempt is appropriate, the court has
at least two distinct choices. It may adjudicate the individual in
contempt and fashion an immediate sanction, or it may choose
to issue a conditional contempt order, giving the party one
more opportunity to avoid incarceration.63 Mindful of the
supreme court's caution about excessive delay in enforcing
support obligations,' a court may conclude that further delay
is unacceptable. If so, the court may direct the contemnor's
immediate incarceration and specify the conditions for release.
As with any civil contempt sanction, the contemnor must al-
ways have "the keys to the jail cell" in his or her pocket.65 In
setting the conditions for release, the court must determine
that it is in the contemnor's power to perform the conditions
and obtain release.66 The court need not insist upon complete
compliance, but may specify that the contemnor be released
upon partial performance, such as payment of a portion of sup-
port arrearages. In some cases, the courts have released con-
temnors upon their submission of, and commitment to, a plan
for satisfying the breached obligation.67 If the court has con-
cluded that the contemnor has the ability to satisfy the obliga-
tion in full, the court may insist upon complete performance.68
Although the primary purpose of a civil contempt sanction is
to coerce compliance with an existing obligation, the court
may impose additional obligations if the contemnor's miscon-
duct has prejudiced the party whose rights the court was seek-
ing to enforce. Under those circumstances, the contemnor
may be liable to the party for costs and expenses, including
reasonable attorney fees.69 The court may require the contem-
nor to comply with the preexisting obligation and to pay the
63. See Knutson v. Zenk, 413 N.W.2d 593, 597-98 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987); see also
Tell v. Tell, 383 N.W.2d 678, 684 (Minn. 1986); Biscoe v. Biscoe, 443 N.W.2d 221,
225 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989).
64. Hopp, 279 Minn. at 174, 156 N.W.2d at 216.
65. Mahady v. Mahady, 448 N.W.2d 888, 890 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989).
66. See MINN. STAT. § 588.12 (1990).
67. Hopp, 279 Minn. at 175, 156 N.W.2d at 217 (stating that in some cases, a
confined party should be able to effect release by agreement to comply as directed);
see also Maher v. Maher, 393 N.W.2d 190, 195 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (holding con-
temnor could purge contempt and secure vacation of remaining sentence upon
scheduled payments of unpaid obligations).
68. See MINN. STAT. § 588.12 (1990) (providing that court may imprison contem-
nor until act performed).
69. See MINN. STAT. § 588.11 (1990); see also Time-Share Sys., Inc. v. Schmidt, 397
N.W.2d 438, 441 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
19921
11
Wozniak and Lehr: Dealing with a Double-edged Sword: A Practical Guide to Contempt
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1992
WILLIAM MITCHELL LA W REVIEW
additional award of costs and fees to purge the contempt."
The party seeking enforcement of a contempt order must
submit affidavits which detail the initial default and the failure
to comply with any purging conditions. 7' That party must also
participate in the court hearings. To require the obligee to in-
cur these expenses without hope of reimbursement would, in
effect, diminish the value of the underlying obligation. The in-
clusion of an allowance of costs and fees does not convert the
proceeding to a criminal contempt, and such awards are
merely ancillary to the civil contempt sanction of confinement,
although they may not be avoided by compliance with the con-
ditions which effect the contemnor's release.
Frequently, Minnesota's courts will elect to adjudge a party
in contempt but will stay confinement and afford the party an
additional opportunity to purge the contempt prior to the im-
position of that sanction.71 Such "conditional" contempt or-
ders represent the court's prediction that the clear threat of
incarceration may be sufficient to coerce meaningful compli-
ance. A conditional contempt order must address all of the
Hopp criteria and is proper only if the court concludes that in-
carceration is reasonably likely to induce performance.73
The conditions set forth in a conditional contempt order will
resemble the conditions for release that accompany a civil con-
tempt order imposing immediate incarceration, and they are
subject to the same restraints. A proper conditional civil con-
tempt order will find that the obligor has defaulted despite the
ability to comply and that confinement is likely to induce com-
pliance. 4 The order will stay incarceration on condition that
the obligor performs, or partially performs, prior to a specified
date. Such an order is particularly useful if the court finds that
the contemnor had the ability to meet his or her obligations at
a prior time but does not have the resources, at the time he or
70. Time-Share Sys., 397 N.W.2d at 441.
71. See Campbell v. Motion Picture Mach. Operators, 151 Minn. 238, 242, 186
N.W. 787, 789 (1922) (holding that award must be based on proof of actual
damages).
72. See, e.g., Knutson v. Zenk, 413 N.W.2d 593, 598 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (hold-
ing that trial court did not abuse its discretion in staying consequences of civil
contempt).
73. See, e.g., Gustafson v. Gustafson, 414 N.W.2d 235, 237-38 (Minn. Ct. App.
1987) (holding that trial court's order vacating stay of execution and enforcing con-
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she comes before the court, to remedy the entire default imme-
diately. Under those circumstances, the court may afford the
contemnor a further opportunity to purge the contempt prior
to incarceration.
The most common defect in conditional contempt orders is-
sued by the trial courts in Minnesota is the existence of a con-
dition that the obligor meet future obligations for a certain
period, to avoid incarceration.75 Since the conditional con-
tempt order most often arises in the context of a civil proceed-
ing, its purpose, like any final order in a civil contempt
proceeding, is to coerce compliance with a preexisting obliga-
tion. 76 The payment of future obligations does nothing to
purge the prior failure to perform, and it has the improper ef-
fect of premising a contempt sanction on conduct which has
not occurred when the court issues its finding of contempt.
The civil contempt sanction must be limited to coercing com-
pliance with the preexisting obligation; any effect on future
performance is a salutory by-product.
If a court has issued a conditional contempt order, affording
the contemnor an additional opportunity to purge the con-
tempt and avoid incarceration, any failure to purge will occur
outside the presence of the court. Accordingly, the party seek-
ing enforcement must bring the failure to purge before the
court by submission of an affidavit. 77 The court may not pro-
vide for automatic confinement upon a breach of the condi-
tions of the stay. 78 The contemnor is entitled to a further
hearing on the failure to purge.79
The scope of the second hearing is limited to the contem-
nor's ability to comply with the purge conditions during the
period since the finding of contempt. The initial findings are
75. Although no published opinion addresses this issue, the court of appeals has
encountered this issue in numerous petitions for extraordinary relief. Petitions for
mandamus or prohibition are resolved most often by unpublished order of the spe-
cial term panel, without full briefing or opinion.
76. See supra note 67.
77. See Clausen v. Clausen, 250 Minn. 293, 298, 84 N.W.2d 675, 679 (1957).
78. Mahady v. Mahady, 448 N.W.2d 888, 891 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (holding
that trial court must determine that obligor failed without excuse to comply with
purge conditions before finding obligor in contempt).
79. See, e.g., id.; Gustafson v. Gustafson, 414 N.W.2d 235, 237 (Minn. Ct. App.
1987) (finding that contemnor afforded at least two opportunities to show compli-
ance or to present reasons for failure to purge).
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neither relitigated nor subject to collateral attack.8 0 The con-
temnor bears the burden of establishing a reasonable excuse
for failure to comply with the purge conditions, but the trial
court must make an explicit finding that the contemnor had the
ability to comply.8 '
In addition to the notice and hearing aspects enumerated in
Hopp, the Minnesota Supreme Court has enlarged the proce-
dural protection in constructive civil contempt proceedings. A
nonperforming party has a right to legal counsel at a point in
the proceeding that "incarceration is a real possibility."
82
Until recently, imprisonment for civil contempt was not sub-
ject to any statutory limits. 83  However, in 1988, Congress
sought to curtail apparent abuses by imposing an eighteen
month limitation on imprisonment for civil contempt.84 Once
a civil contempt sentence has been announced, the only way
the imprisoned contemnor may obtain release, other than by
compliance with the previous order, is to remain in prison long
enough to demonstrate that imprisonment will not have the
desired coercive effect.8 5 Determining when that point has
been reached is solely within the sentencing court's
discretion.86
80. Because a conditional contempt order is not final or appealable, the initial
findings will be subject to appellate review on appeal from a final contempt order,
issued after a "second stage" hearing. See Mahady, 448 N.W.2d at 891. Nonetheless,
the trial court may properly limit the scope of the second hearing to the behavior of
the contemnor since the issuance of the conditional contempt order.
81. Id. at 890-91; Zieman v. Zieman, 265 Minn. 190, 193 n.5, 121 N.W.2d 77, 80
n.5 (1963).
82. Cox v. Slama, 355 N.W.2d 401, 403 (Minn. 1984). While the supreme court
in Cox recognized the right to counsel stemming from both the United States and
Minnesota Constitutions, the issue was not decided on constitutional grounds.
Rather, the court relied on its "supervisory powers to ensure the fair administration
ofjustice .... I Id.; see also Walz v. Walz, 409 N.W.2d 39, 40 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
83. Dobbs, supra note 21, at 26.
84. See 28 U.S.C. § 1826(a)(2) (1988). Congress passed this federal statute
largely in response to the incarceration of Dr. Elizabeth Morgan when she refused to
reveal the location of her daughter, alleging that her ex-husband was sexually abus-
ing the child. See Morgan v. Foretich, 521 A.2d 248 (D.C. 1987). Interestingly, early
commentators advocated confinement for life for failure to comply with a court or-
der. See generally, Paul G. Kauper, Comment, Equity - Contempt - Duration of Imprison-
ment, 36 MICH. L. REv. 1016, 1018 (1938).
85. See generally Doug Rendleman, Disobedience and Coercive Contempt Confinement:
The Terminally Stubborn Contemnor, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 185 (1991).
86. See, e.g., Minnesota State Bar Ass'n v. Divorce Assitance Ass'n, 341 Minn.
276, 286, 248 N.W.2d 733, 741 (1976) (noting "admittedly broad discretion" of trial
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As noted previously, the purpose of criminal contempt pro-
ceedings is to vindicate the authority of the court by punishing
a person for past conduct.87 The Minnesota legislature has
identified a variety of acts which constitute criminal con-
tempt.88 Some of the acts occur in the presence of the court
during court proceedings and constitute direct contempt,
which may be punished summarily. For instance, disorderly or
"insolent" behavior tending to interrupt proceedings or to im-
pair the respect due the court may be dealt with immediately,
without a further hearing, because the facts are known to the
court and will appear on the record.8 9 If the purpose of the
court's sanction is to punish behavior which has already oc-
curred, and to exercise its authority over the courtroom, a find-
ing of direct criminal contempt is appropriate. 90
Acts constituting criminal contempt which occur outside the
presence of the court are classified as constructive criminal
contempt. Disobedience of a direct court order or subpoena,
or the publication of "a false or grossly inaccurate report" of
court proceedings, must be brought to the court's attention
because it does not occur in the immediate view of the court.9
As a prerequisite for an adjudication of constructive criminal
contempt, there must be a clear definition of the acts to be
performed.9 2 Criminal contempt punishes a show of disre-
court where contemnor acts "contumaciously, in bad faith, and out of disrespect for
the judicial process").
87. See, e.g., id at 285, 248 N.W.2d at 741.
88. MINN. STAT. § 588.20 (1990). See generally 8 DUNNELL MINN. DIGEST Contempt
§ 1.01 (4th ed. 1990).
89. MINN. STAT. §§ 588.03, 588.20(1) (1990); State ex. rel. Russell v. Ives, 60
Minn. 478, 479, 62 N.W. 831, 832 (1895) (providing that the trial court must issue an
order reciting the events which occurred in its presence).
90. Peterson, 278 Minn. at 280, 153 N.W.2d at 830.
91. MINN. STAT. § 588.20(4), (7) (1990); MINN. R. Civ. P. 45.07.
92. Although there is little case law on point, due process considerations would
seem to require that a party held in direct criminal contempt should also be advised
of the potential consequences of his or her conduct. However, since ignorance of the
law is no excuse, and the purpose of summary adjudications of criminal contempt is
to assert the court's authority over pending proceedings, it is unlikely that an appel-
late court would reverse a finding of direct contempt which followed, without warn-
ing, from conduct which clearly evidenced a lack of respect for the trial court. See In
reJenison, 265 Minn. 96, 103, 120 N.W.2d 515, 520, vacated on other grounds 375 U.S.
14 (1963). See generally Annotation, Lack of Notice to Contemnor at Time of Contemptuous
Conduct of Possible Criminal Contempt Sanctions as Affecting Prosecution For Contempt in Fed-
eral Court, 76 A.L.R. FED. 797 (1986).
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spect to the court, and it is limited to clearly defined obliga-
tions owed to the court. The court will not use criminal
contempt to enforce obligations owed by one party to another,
nor will it impose sanctions without adequate notice of the na-
ture of the obligation imposed by the court.93
A criminal contempt action is distinct from its underlying ac-
tion.94 The public alone charges the defendant in a criminal
contempt proceeding. 95 If an accused contemnor had the abil-
ity to conform his or her conduct but failed to do so, punish-
ment to the extent permitted by statute is appropriate, without
regard for the contemnor's current ability to comply. 96
Criminal contempt constitutes a misdemeanor,97 and the al-
leged contemnor is entitled to the procedural safeguards appli-
cable to other criminal prosecutions.9" The alleged contemnor
is entitled to a written complaint 99 and a jury trial,' 00 may tes-
tify on his or her own behalf,' 0' and may assert the right
against self incrimination. 0 2 The prosecutor must establish
the elements of the contempt beyond a reasonable doubt.'0 3
The contemnor also may not be placed in double jeopardy.'0 4
Since contempt is punishable by incarceration, the alleged con-
temnor has the right to counsel, including the right to ap-
pointed counsel for indigent defendants.'0 5
93. In re Welfare of A.W., 399 N.W.2d 223, 225 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
94. E.g., Zieman v. Zieman, 265 Minn. 190, 193-94, 121 N.W.2d 77, 80 (1963).
95. Russell v. United States, 86 F.2d 389, 392 (8th Cir. 1936).
96. See Clausen v. Clausen, 250 Minn. 293, 299, 84 N.W.2d 675, 680 (1957);
Wenger v. Wenger, 200 Minn. 436, 442, 274 N.W. 517, 520 (1937).
97. MINN. STAT. § 588.20 (1990).
98. Peterson v. Peterson, 278 Minn. 275, 277, 153 N.W.2d 825, 827 (1967); In re
Welfare of A.W., 399 N.W.2d 223, 225 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
99. MINN. R. CRIM. P. 2.01.
100. See Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506, 512 (1974) (holding that the
Sixth Amendment right to ajury trial is invoked if contempt sentence is greater than
six months).
101. Krmpotich v. Krmpotich, 227 Minn. 567, 569, 35 N.W.2d 810, 811 (1949)
(refusing to allow contemnor to testify is reversible error).
102. State ex rel. Sandquist v. District Court, 144 Minn. 326, 330, 175 N.W. 908,
909 (1919).
103. State v. Binder, 190 Minn. 305, 311, 251 N.W. 665, 668 (1933).
104. Yates v. United States, 355 U.S. 66, 74-75 (1957). The prohibition against
double jeopardy has specific application to a witness who refuses to answer repeated
questions. While each refusal evidences a lack of respect for the court, the contem-
nor is protected by Minnesota's prohibition against multiple prosecutions for a single
behavioral incident. MINN. STAT. § 609.035 (1990 & Supp. 1991); In re Armentrout,
No. C6-91-1505, 1992 WL 15913 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 4, 1992).
105. MINN. R. CRIM. P. 5.02, subd. 2.
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Misdemeanors generally are punishable by imprisonment
not exceeding ninety days and a fine not exceeding $700. 106
This limitation applies to the specific types of contumacious
behavior defined in Minnesota Statutes section 588.20. How-
ever, acts of constructive criminal contempt may be punished
by imprisonment not exceeding six months and a fine not ex-
ceeding $250.10 7 The statutory maximum may be imposed for
each count of contempt arising from a separate behavioral inci-
dent. 108 While the statutes authorize substantial penalties for
criminal contempt, those penalties are reserved for cases of di-
rect contempt and for constructive contempt which harms a
party.'0 9 If an act of constructive criminal contempt has not
defeated or prejudiced the rights of a party to an action, the
court may not incarcerate the contemnor or impose any fine
exceeding $50.1"O
VII. APPELLATE REVIEW
Although the characterization of the proceedings in the trial
court is not binding on the appellate court,"'. that characteri-
zation will govern the timing of any appeal and will define the
parties to the action." 12
Because a civil contempt proceeding is considered part of
the original cause of action involving the same parties, the fed-
eral courts treat a contempt citation as an interlocutory order.
Consequently, a civil contempt order cannot be appealed
through the usual appellate channels until the entire cause of
action ends.'1' In Minnesota, the concept of finality controls.
If a non-party is adjudged to be in contempt, they need not
await the outcome of the action. Since the rights of non-par-
ties will not be determined by the judgment, they have an im-
mediate right to appeal."
l 4
A conditional civil contempt order, or one which directs con-
sequences only if the contemnor fails to purge the contempt, is
106. MINN. STAT. § 609.03(3) (1990).
107. MINN. STAT. § 588.10 (1990).
108. Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506, 514 (1974); Yates, 355 U.S. at 74-75.
109. See MINN. STAT. § 588.02 (1990).
110. MINN. STAT. § 588.02 (1990).
111. See supra note 20.
112. JACK FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 717 (1985).
113. See Fox v. Capital Co., 299 U.S. 105, 107 (1936).
114. United States v. Pfizer, 560 F.2d 326, 332-33 n.10 (8th Cir. 1977).
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not final or appealable.'" 5 Similarly, a contempt order which
reserves both the conditions for purging the contempt and im-
position of sanctions for later determination is not appeala-
ble.'I 6 However, if a contempt order imposes fines, costs, or
attorney fees without conditions by which the contemnor could
purge the contempt, it is a final order and appealable." 7
A criminal contempt citation may be appealed without re-
gard for any underlying action because the contempt proceed-
ing constitutes a separate cause of action. A final adjudication
of criminal contempt is appealable regardless of the stage of
any underlying cause of action." 8 While older cases required
that criminal contempt proceedings be reviewed by certio-
rari,'' 9 a direct appeal may now be taken from any criminal
contempt conviction.
20
The court of appeals receives many inquiries from counsel
regarding the appropriate way to obtain a stay of a contempt
sanction pending appeal. In a case involving criminal con-
tempt, the contemnor must first apply to the trial court.'
2' If
the trial court refuses to permit release pending appeal, it must
state the reasons for its denial on the record. 2 2 In the event of
a denial, the contemnor may make a motion for release to the
court of appeals once an appeal has been filed and jurisdiction
has vested.12 3 Counsel may not rest upon conclusory state-
ments but must establish that the appellant is unlikely to flee if
the appeal fails, that the contemnor will not commit a serious
crime or intimidate witnesses if free during the appeal, and
115. Tell v. Tell, 383 N.W.2d 678, 685 (Minn. 1986) (holding defendant had right
to appeal from contempt order included in trial court's final judgment); Becker v.
Becker, 300 Minn. 512, 513, 217 N.W.2d 849, 850 (1974) (holding defendant in con-
tempt for failure to pay child support); Rohrman v. Moore, 423 N.W.2d 717, 721
(Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (holding defendant in contempt for nonpayment of child sup-
port despite not being served with order to show cause).
116. Johnson v. Johnson, 439 N.W.2d 430, 431 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989).
117. Time-Share Sys., Inc. v. Schmidt, 397 N.W.2d 438, 440 (Minn. Ct. App.
1986); see MINN. R. Civ. App. P. 103.03(e).
118. Union Tool Co. v. Wilson, 259 U.S. 107, 110 (1922).
119. See, e.g., Gardner v. Conway, 234 Minn. 468, 473-74, 48 N.W.2d 788, 792
(1951).
120. See MINN. R. CRIM. P. 28.02, subd. 2(1). The appeal must be taken within 10
days. Id. subd. 4(3). The sentence, however, is not appealable as a matter of right. A
contemnor must seek discretionary review if challenging the sentence. Id. subd. 2(3).
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that the appeal is not frivolous or taken for delay. 124 A motion
for release pending appeal will be expedited but will not be
handled on an emergency basis.' 25 The court shall consider
whether the defendant would serve the entire sentence before
an appeal could be decided.'2 6
The procedure in civil contempt cases is similar to the proce-
dure in criminal contempt cases. The filing of an appeal does
not result in an automatic stay. However, the contemnor, like
any civil appellant, may move the trial court to establish a su-
persedeas bond to stay enforcement pending a decision on the
appeal. 27 The focus in a civil case is upon the financial risk to
the respondent caused by waiting to enforce the contempt or-
der until the appeal is decided. If the trial court awarded costs
or fees, the appellant must post a bond to insure payment, plus
damages which may be awarded on appeal. 128 An appellant
may move the appellate court to reduce the supersedeas bond
established by the trial court.' 2 9 If the trial court has ordered
incarceration to induce compliance, the respondent is unlikely
to suffer financial damage from a delay in enforcement, and no
supersedeas bond will be required. 30 In most cases, a trial
court will stay a civil contempt incarceration order if counsel
requests it by proper motion and addresses the applicable
provisions.
When reviewing contempt proceedings, the appellate court
must first determine, by examining the sanction imposed by
the trial court, whether to apply standards for criminal or civil
contempt.' 3 ' Thereafter, the court reviews the procedural is-
124. Id. subd. 7(2); State v. McKinley, 424 N.W.2d 586 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).
125. State v. Johnson, 447 N.W.2d 605, 608 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989). Counsel are
frequently aware that the client faces incarceration for criminal contempt on a spe-
cific date, and should be prepared to make a motion for release and address the
relevant criteria when the sentence is announced. In cases involving summary pun-
ishment for direct contempt, such advance preparation is not always possible, but the
court of appeals will not overlook a failure to seek relief in the trial court.
126. MINN. R. CRIM. P. 28.02, subd. 7(1).
127. MINN. R. Civ. App. P. 108.01, subd. 1.
128. Id. subd. 3.
129. Sisto v. Housing & Redev. Auth., 258 Minn. 391, 395, 104 N.W.2d 529, 532
(1960).
130. See MINN. R. Civ. App. P. 108.01, subds. 2, 6.
131. In re Welfare of EJ.B., 466 N.W.2d 768, 769 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991).
Whether contempt is civil or criminal is determined by the court's purpose
in responding to the alleged misconduct .... The purpose of civil contempt
is to coerce future compliance .... Criminal contempt is to preserve the
authority of the court by punishing past misconduct."
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sues, without deference to the trial court's decisions on the
process due the contemnor.132 Finally, if necessary, the court
reviews "the evidence submitted to determine whether the trial
court's order ... was arbitrary and unreasonable or whether it
finds support in the record ... ."3
The underlying factual findings are subject to reversal only if
clearly erroneous.' 34 The trial court's decision to invoke the
contempt powers is subject to reversal only if the appellate
court finds an abuse of discretion. 35 A finding of direct con-
tempt, based on the trial court's firsthand observation of the
contemnor's conduct, will be reversed only if the trial court
acted "capriciously, oppressively, or arbitrarily." 136 The rare
contempt order justifying a finding that the trial court has
abused its discretion is, more often than not, affected by proce-
dural errors requiring reversal, 37 so that few contempt orders
are reversed solely on the ground that the trial court abused its
discretion in imposing a contempt sanction.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The power to enforce the decisions of the courts and to im-
pose order in courtroom proceedings is expressed in the
power to hold individuals in contempt. The contempt power is
an effective, extraordinary remedy. But a decision to draw the
double-edged sword from its scabbard requires careful atten-
tion to procedure and unequaled focus in crafting an appropri-
ate sanction.
Whether presented to the court by a party's motion to hold
another in contempt or by conduct disrespectful to the court, a
trial judge must initially determine the specific purpose of in-
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting In re Welfare of A.W., 399 N.W.2d 223, 225 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1987)).
132. Procedural errors account for a large share of appellate reversals of contempt
orders. See, e.g., E.J.B., 466 N.W.2d at 769; A. W, 399 N.W.2d at 225.
133. Meisner v. Meisner, 220 Minn. 559, 560-61, 20 N.W.2d 486, 488 (1945); see
also Gustafson v. Gustafson, 414 N.W.2d 235, 237 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) ("The only
objective in exercising civil contempt powers in dissolution cases 'is to secure compli-
ance with an order presumed to be reasonable.' ") (quoting Hopp v. Hopp, 279
Minn. 170, 173, 156 N.W.2d 212, 216 (1968)).
134. MINN. R. Civ. P. 52.01.
135. See Erickson v. Erickson, 385 N.W.2d 301, 304 (Minn. 1986).
136. In re Jenison, 265 Minn. 96, 103, 120 N.W.2d 515, 520, vacated on other
grounds, 375 U.S. 14 (1963).
137. See In re Welfare of A.W., 399 N.W.2d 223 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
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voking the contempt power. Most contempt proceedings will
involve an allegation of constructive contempt, and great care
must be taken to insure that the alleged contemnor is afforded
the procedures commensurate with the civil or criminal nature
of the action. Even in cases involving direct contempt subject
to summary treatment, a failure to identify the purpose of a
contempt sanction increases the risk that imposition of an im-
proper sanction will require reversal.
Armed with an understanding of purpose and procedures,
trial judges and practitioners seeking to employ the power of
contempt can avoid Damocles' sense of impending disaster,
confident that they wield the ancient sword with a greater un-
derstanding of its strengths and its limitations.
21
Wozniak and Lehr: Dealing with a Double-edged Sword: A Practical Guide to Contempt
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1992
22
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 1 [1992], Art. 2
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol18/iss1/2
